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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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TiCE-Committee of United States Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
In 1986, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that United
States military support of the Nicaraguan Contras violated both customary international law and a treaty between the United States and Nicaragua. The ICJ further determined that the United States had a duty to
refrain from additional violations. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nica. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14. The
United States, however, continued to allocate funds for the activities that
the ICJ found illegal. The plaintiffs then brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory
relief as well as an injunction against continued funding of the Contras.
The plaintiffs alleged that the funding violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982), the first and fifth amendments
to the United States Constitution, article 94 of the United Nations Charter, and customary international law.
The district court ruled that the case involved a nonjusticiable political
question and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. While the United
1097

1098

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:1097

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the
claims justiciable, it determined that they warranted dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The court of appeals reasoned that the district court's blanket use of
the political question doctrine was an inappropriate reason for dismissal
because not every issue touching on foreign relations is beyond the power
of courts. The court then addressed the specifics of the claims presented
and determined that each should be dismissed. The court held that the
judicial branch lacks the power to intervene when Congressional action
is inconsistent with either an international treaty or a rule of customary
international law. Consequently, the court could not grant relief for such
claims. Moreover, private citizens initiated this suit to force specific action by their government in response to an ICJ decision. The court of
appeals found that the ICJ is designed to resolve disputes between national governments and should not be used as a weapon by private citizens to force action by their own government. As to the plaintiffs' fifth
amendment claims, the court held that the plaintiffs did not establish a
causal link between the violations of international law and their injuries.
The court, however, was careful not to foreclose the validity of a future
claim by private citizens that Congressional action in pursuit of foreign
policy constitutes deprivation of liberty or property without due process
of law. Significance-The importance of the decision lies in its extensive
treatment of the interrelationship between international and domestic
law.
II.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT PRECLUDES DOMESTIC
COURT JURISDICTION OVER A CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF A
PLANE CRASH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

WHEN THE AIRPLANE IS

OWNED BY AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT-

Compania Mexicana de Aviacion v. U.S. Dist. Court, 859 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs commenced an action in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California on behalf of ninety-six Mexican nationals who were killed when Compania Mexicana de Aviacion flight
940 crashed near Mexico City shortly after takeoff on March 31, 1986.
The defendant moved for dismissal, claiming both foreign sovereign immunity and forum non conveniens. When the district court denied the
motion, the defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals held that denial of a
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motion to dismiss for foreign sovereign immunity is a collateral order
entitled to immediate appeal. The court then construed the mandamus
petition as notice of appeal.
In addressing the merits of the motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit
held that the defendant is an agent of the Mexican Government and
therefore a foreign state for the purpose of foreign sovereign immunity.
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§
1602-11 (1982), United States courts must dismiss suits brought against
foreign sovereigns unless the defendant satisfies one of the exceptions
provided in the FSIA. Although the defendant airline had signed a
waiver with the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) to
gain DOT permission to fly into the United States, the court found that
this did not constitute a waiver of immunity under the FSIA. The court
reasoned that the DOT waiver was intended to gain jurisdiction over the
airline in cases having substantial contact with the United States. The
court held that no contact existed in the instant case because the passengers had purchased their tickets in Mexico for travel within Mexico. No
action taken by the defendant occurred "under [the] permit" issued by
the DOT. The action also did not fit within the commercial activity exception to the FSIA because no causal connection existed between the
cause of action and any commercial activity in the United States. Held:
Reversed and remanded to the district court with an order to dismiss the
action pursuant to the FSIA. Significance-Even though an instrumentality of a foreign government may consent to suit in the United States, it
cannot be brought into a domestic court against its will for activities
wholly unconnected to the United States.
III.

FOREIGN

ACCESS

TO UNITED STATES COURTS

Two recent cases reached different results on the issue of whether an
instrumentality of a foreign government not formally recognized by the
United States Government can gain access to United States courts for the
purpose of bringing suit against American defendants. Although the
cases came to opposite conclusions on the basic issue, each can be justified on its specific facts.
AN UNRECOGNIZED PANAMANIAN

REGIME LACKS STANDING TO

IN-

TERVENE IN AN ACTION BROUGHT BY THE RECOGNIZED PANAMANIAN
GOVERNMENT TO ENJOIN THE TRANSFER OF PANAMANIAN

GOVERN-

BANKS-Republic of Panama v. Citizens & Southern International Banks, 682 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla.
MENT FUNDS OUT OF AMERICAN
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1988).
Banco National de Panama (BNP) and the unrecognized government
of Panama headed by General Manuel Noriega moved to intervene in an
action brought by the legitimate Panamanian Government to freeze Panamanian funds held in United States bank accounts. The case concerned
the issue of whether the funds in the American bank accounts belong to
the recognized Delvalle Government or to the unrecognized government
of General Noriega.
On March 1, 1988, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida entered a preliminary injunction against the disbursement of funds from the American bank accounts. In ruling on the subsequent motions to intervene made by BNP and the Noriega Government
the court Held: Denied. The court ruled that the executive branch has
the exclusive power to "recognize and legitimize" foreign governments
and that a decision not to recognize a foreign government is binding on
the courts. Because an unrecognized government is denied access to
United States courts, the Noriega regime had no standing to intervene in
the case. With respect to BNP's motion to intervene, the court held that
the agent of an unrecognized foreign government can also be denied access to United States courts. While BNP would have standing if it were
a purely private enterprise, the court considered it an arm of the illegitimate government and thus denied its motion to intervene in the action.
AN INSTRUMENTALITY

OF AN UNRECOGNIZED FOREIGN GOVERN-

MENT HAS STANDING TO BRING SUIT IN A UNITED STATES COURT IF

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONSENTS-National Petrochemical Co.

v.

MIT Salt Sheaf 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988).
This suit arose after President Carter severed diplomatic relations
with Iran in response to the detention of fifty-two American hostages
following the 1979 Iranian revolution. The plaintiff, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company, an instrumentality of
the Iranian Government, attempted to circumvent the ban on sale of
American products to Iran by contracting with middlemen in Hamburg
and Rotterdam. When the products did not reach Iran, the plaintiff
sought to bring suit in the United States. The primary issue was
whether the plaintiff could bring suit in the United States or whether
such suit was precluded because the United States Government did not
recognize the Iranian Government.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed the case. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Held: Reversed. The case was
reinstated and remanded to the district court for trial. At the outset the
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court noted that to answer the issue "in this shoal strewn area of the
law, it is wise for courts to have in mind... that they must 'first, do no
harm.' " 860 F.2d at 552. In holding that the plaintiff could bring its
claim, the court did not overturn the rule that in order to benefit from
the grant of diversity jurisdiction, the foreign government of the instrumentality must be formally recognized by the United States Government.
Rather, the court reasoned that a break in diplomatic relations does not
warrant automatic denial of access to United States courts. The court
noted that the executive branch retains the exclusive power to recognize
or refuse to recognize a foreign government. The court nevertheless proceeded to hold that the executive department may cut off diplomatic relations without intending to preclude access to United States courts. Similarly, the executive department may recognize a government for the
limited purpose of allowing access to courts.
In the instant case, the executive department filed a statement of interest with the court stating: "It is the position of the Executive Branch that
the Iranian government and its instrumentality should be afforded access
to our courts for purposes of resolution of the instant dispute." 860 F.2d
at 555. The court found that a dichotomy of recognition is required by
the current state of foreign relations for two reasons. First, the practice
of extending formal recognition is not as frequently given as in the past
because it has been misinterpreted as approval of all of the actions of the
foreign government. Second, the executive branch needs flexibility to
conduct foreign relations, which includes the power to allow access to
United States courts even if the government is not formally recognized.
Significance-Read together, these two decisions indicate that access
to United States courts is evolving from the strict principle of "no formal
recognition, no access" to a policy-based political decision by the executive department; therefore, questions of access to United States courts
will be decided on a case-by-case basis.

